What seemed to be a rapidly escalating situation has now come to a halt. The two-and-a-half-month long standoff between India and China at Doklam ended last week. A statement from the Ministry of External Affairs confirmed that both countries had agreed to disengage at the India-China-Bhutan junction point. The faceoff began back in June, when soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved into an area known as Turning Point with road-building equipment. The area in question is Bhutanese territory. However, the Chinese regard this territory as its sovereign domain. As the soldiers of the Royal Bhutan Army were pushed back, Indian soldiers stepped in. The action by Indian troops was in line with the India Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007. According to Article 2 of the treaty, governments of both the countries are committed to resisting any use of their respective territories for activities that might be harmful to the other’s national security. As diplomatic channels were opened, troops on both sides of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) refused to cede ground. For India, this was not just about safeguarding Bhutan’s sovereignty, but about maintaining control over a strategically important position. Finally, as shrewd diplomacy achieved fruition, both sides decided to resolve the matter without resorting to armed aggression. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has maintained that its soldiers would continue to patrol the area. However, the construction equipment has been removed for now.
Not the first time but...
Incidents of Chinese incursion into the Indian territory is nothing new. Earlier attempts by the PLA to build shelters at Plum Post in Arunachal Pradesh or to camp at Raki Nala in Ladakh have all been resolved quickly. However, the Doklam standoff was not just another act of cartographic aggression. In fact, this was the first time in years when the situation looked like it could escalate into an armed conflict.
While similar situations in the past were resolved smoothly, this issue was difficult to crack diplomatically. Both countries remain aware of the geostrategic importance of the region. With the standoff in its nascent stages, New Delhi had officially registered its dissatisfaction with the Chinese government. The construction of a road in the Doklam region would have implied a major change in the status quo. It would have had serious implications for India’s security, the Ministry of External Affairs conveyed.
A serious threat to a strategically vital area
One might wonder why a road from the Chinese side of the LAC to the Doka La post in Bhutan might pose a threat to India’s national security. The answer becomes quite clear once you glance at a map. The standoff took place at the Doka La post – which is where the tri-junction is according to Bhutan. However, China asserts that the real tri-junction exists further south at a spot called Gamochen. If the Chinese were to have their way, the Sino-Bhutan border would shift at Doklam region, bringing them closer to the strategically important as well as vulnerable Siligudi Corridor.
The Siligudi Corridor
India has a rather strange shape, thanks to its former colonial rulers. As the British partitioned India along religious lines, the North East became isolated from the rest of the country.
Surrounded by China, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh, the North Eastern states, 2.6 lakh sq km in area, remain connected to rest of India via a narrow strip of land.
Referred to as the Chicken’s Neck, this 200 km long stretch has varying widths. With an average width of 60 km, the area slims down to only four km at Tetulia, Bangladesh. Formally known as the Siligudi Corridor, this narrow region has always been a cause for concern for India’s security apparatus. The Siligudi Corridor serves as a hub of rail and road connectivity. It is the sole link between North East and the rest of India via the NH 31, NH 31A and the New Jalpaiguri (NJP) railway station. Not only is it vital for North East’s economic growth, its importance in terms of national security is relatively high.
A potential choke point
The North East, along with the Siligudi Corridor, houses major military formations. The Army’s III Corps, IV Corps and XXXIII Corps, based in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, Sikkim and West Bengal respectively, employ more than a million soldiers. These Mountain Divisions in Sikkim and West Bengal, along with Arunachal Scouts are directly responsible for guarding the McMohan Line and the LAC. Therefore, any blockade in the Siligudi Corridor would directly cut off supplies and reinforcements to the security forces.
China eyeing the region
China has for long been trying to enhance its strategic assets in the Doklam Plateau. In fact, it has been strengthening its military around Chumbi Valley, which lies in striking distance of the Siligudi Corridor. China has already upgraded the road from Lhasa to Yadong (the region where the standoff took place), which is close to the Nathu La Pass in Sikkim. The upgraded road allows a distance of 500 km to be covered in just seven hours. Moreover, plans of constructing a Trans-Himalayan railway network to connect Yadong to Xigaze, Tibet, are already underway. The Chinese were attempting to construct a road towards Gamochen at the tri-junction. A successful construction of the road would enable the PLA to transport tanks, artillery and other equipment to the border at short notice. Such ability would have facilitated the formation of more launchpads for military operations in the region. Consequently, targeting Indian outposts in the Sikkim sector would have been much easier for the PLA.
Many more threats to the Siligudi Corridor
It’s not just the Chinese aggression that endangers peace in the region. The area is also under constant threat from nefarious cross-border influence. To the south of the corridor is Bangladesh, with whom India shares a highly porous border. The rise in the number of unregistered Madrasas in and around the corridor during the last decade points to unabated illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Such infiltration has resulted in significant change in the demographic profile of districts like North Dinajpur and Malda. Substantial rise in illegal immigrant population has further vitiated communal harmony. Riots in Malda last year are a good case in point. Further, Kaliachak in Malda district, for instance, is a transit point for counterfeit currency printed in Pakistan. Numerous fake currency printing units have come up in the Chapai Nawabganj district, in Bangladesh, according to the NIA. These notes are then distributed all over India through direct rail-road links in Malda and Siligudi. That’s not all. Operatives of Bangladesh-based terror group Jammat-ul-Mujahideen have significant presence in the region.
Add to that the North East Insurgency
Another significant threat the Siligudi Corridor faces comes from insurgents in the North East. Members of banned militant groups such as KLO, ULFA and NSCN have been using the corridor for movement between the North East and neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh. KLO and ULFA, in particular, have been actively engaged in extortion and kidnapping tea garden owners around Siligudi. Further, incidents like bicycle bombing in Jalpaiguri and serial blasts in Assam prove the presence of these groups is a serious menace to the region.
Anti-India elements working in tandem
The most unnerving factor has been the nexus among anti-India elements in this region. Pakistan has tried its best to exacerbate trouble in this sensitive area. German historian Hein G. Kiessling, who lived in Pakistan for over a decade, claims in his book that the ISI helped arm ULFA and NSCN in the early 90s. Further, he claims, banned outfits in the North East maintained contacts with the ISI via the Pakistan Embassy in Dhaka. Such accusations, though unproven, are not surprising. Pakistan has used foreign soil for subversive activities against India. Apart from smuggling fake currency notes through the Indo-Bangla border, Pakistan has also used Nepal as a terror launch pad. Recently, the arrest of a Hizbul Mujahideen operative from the Indo-Nepal border confirmed Nepal as an infiltration route for Pak-based terror units. The Chinese themselves have never backed away from fomenting insurgency in the area. Declassified CIA reports suggest that the Chinese have funded rebel groups in the North East since the 1960s.
So can China just go for the jugular?
While there’s no doubt that the Siligudi Corridor can be India’s Achilles’ heel, it’s not all doom and gloom for India. China will eventually upgrade their rail and road connectivity in Doklam and Chumbi Valley. But staging a full-fledged attack against India in the Sikkim sector will not be an easy affair for the PLA. The Doklam Plateau is wedged between Sikkim to the west and Bhutan in the east. Apart from a heavy presence of the Army, the Siligudi Corridor houses two major Indian Air Force bases - one in Bagdogra and the other in Hasimara, both in West Bengal. In case of any Chinese aggression, roads and railway lines in Doklam would be within effective range of artillery units in Sikkim. Moreover, IAF jets from the aforementioned airbases could carry out aerial bombardments in no time, according to experts. Further, the Indian Army maintains a brigade sized military unit in Bhutan’s Haa district. Such presence allows the option of a two-pronged attack if an armed conflict ensues in the Chumbi valley.
Under constant vigil
In view of the additional threats posed by the neighbouring countries, the nation maintains a heavy security presence in and around the Siligudi Corridor. While the Indian Army and Indo-Tibetan Border Police jointly guard the Sino-Indian borders, BSF is responsible for the protection of border along Bangladesh. The Sashastra Seema Bal is responsible for borders shared with Nepal and Bhutan while the Assam Rifles are engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the North East. With the help of state police, security agencies have been able to avert major mishaps in the region. This may not be the last standoff with China in this region. According to the Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat, such incursions in disputed territories are likely in the future. Thus, India must be prepared for any contingency.
