Japan-Russia ties remain grim as Moscow becomes Beijing’s ‘junior partner’

When Russian President Vladimir Putin prepares to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping later this week in Uzbekistan, the two are expected to make bold claims on the strength of their countries’ partnership. But beyond lip service, it is unclear whether the summit will yield any substantial gains for Moscow.

With the war in Ukraine raging, Russia has seen its relationship with China undergo a dramatic shift, as an internationally isolated Moscow becomes more reliant than ever on Beijing — a development that will impact the security landscape in Northeast Asia, particularly in Japan.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin prepares to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week in Uzbekistan, the two are expected to make bold claims on the strength of their partnership. However, beyond lip service, it is unclear whether the summit will yield any substantial gains for Moscow.

The main reason for this is that the nature of the Sino-Russian relationship has fundamentally changed, particularly over the past few decades. Where the Soviet Union once viewed China as a poorer “junior partner” in need of support, the tables have turned decisively, with a rising China — projected to become the world’s largest economy by 2030 — now increasingly able to dictate the direction of bilateral ties.

Walking a fine line

Although Beijing has not turned its back on Moscow, its “no-limits partnership” rhetoric has not matched reality, with Beijing largely limiting itself to avoiding any criticism of the Ukraine invasion as it walks a diplomatic tightrope with Western countries to avoid becoming a target of international sanctions.

“China’s official discourse on Ukraine almost mirrors that of Russia, blaming the West and NATO enlargement for the outbreak of the war,” said Marcin Kaczmarski, an expert on Russia-China relations at the University of Glasgow.

“However, we still haven't seen any substantial Chinese assistance to Russia, either in terms of financial or military support,” Kaczmarski said. “This means China hasn't taken any serious steps suggesting it is willing to challenge the West and openly help Russia.”

While it is true that China has stepped up purchases of Russian oil, it has done so at discounted prices, leading to criticism that it is cashing in on the weak Russian economy. Beijing has also increased business dealings with Moscow — widening an already growing trade imbalance — as Chinese companies look to fill the vacuum left behind by Western companies that have boycotted the country after the Ukraine invasion.

Moreover, China has agreed with Gazprom, Russia’s main gas provider, to pay for gas in rubles and yuan to reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar. The two also plan to reach deals on infrastructure projects.

Analysts, however, say this is nowhere near the level of support Moscow needs to prop up its faltering economy.

Russia’s Marshal Shaposhnikov anti-submarine destroyer fires during the Vostok-2022 military exercises in the Sea of Japan on Sep. 5. | AFP-JIJI

“By buying oil at knock-down prices and moving in where Western companies once stood, China is supporting Russia on the cheap without bearing any serious costs or taking major risks in its relationship with the West,” Kaczmarski said.

Highlighting the fine line Beijing must walk with Russia, the U.S. said earlier this month that Moscow had been forced to turn to pariah states North Korea and Iran to secure desperately needed military supplies such as artillery shells and rockets for its war in Ukraine.

While the Sino-Russian strategic rapprochement is not free of challenges, the two countries have found themselves increasingly aligned on foreign policy and security concerns, often because of pressure from the U.S., which they view as trying to contain them by deploying military assets close to their borders.

Notably, Beijing and Moscow have no obligation to come to each other's aid if attacked, as they have no formal military alliance and are unlikely to forge one in the foreseeable future.

A new bloc in Northeast Asia?

However, this has not prevented them from forging closer military ties and boosting cooperation with defense technology, as highlighted by the intensifying military maneuvers conducted by the two countries, including the multinational Vostok 2022 exercises. Those drills saw joint naval exercises in the Sea of Japan as well as the launch of cruise missiles from an island near Russian-controlled islets off Hokkaido that are also claimed by Japan, which it calls the Northern Territories.

That said, Kaczmarski views Moscow’s growing reliance on Beijing as increasingly worrying for the security landscape in Northeast Asia, as Russia appears to be subordinating some of its political aims in the region to those of China in exchange for support. This, he added, could result in the U.S.-Japanese alliance facing off against an increasingly close Sino-Russian bloc.

A recent uptick in Chinese and Russian military activities near Japan appears to support this, as the two partners boost cooperation on several fronts.

“By joining Chinese aerial and naval patrols around Japan, including joint aviation patrols by the countries' strategic bombers, Russia is clearly indicating that it is ready to follow in China's footsteps,” Kaczmarski said.

“Moscow, which for a long time had no interest in escalating tensions with Japan, is no longer willing to pursue a fully independent regional policy but rather ready to join China in putting political pressure on Japan,” he said, adding that more joint exercises and other military activities directed against Japan and the U.S. in the region were expected in the coming months. “Russia is, in a way, paying China back for its support.”

Tokyo has repeatedly expressed “serious concern” about the location and frequency of the drills, saying that it views these activities as “a demonstration against Japan.”

John Bradford, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, said that Sino-Russian military cooperation could add to the security challenges on Japan’s northern, western and southern flanks.

“This puts Tokyo in a sort of vice that seems to be tightening on multiple sides,” Bradford said.

“At the operational level, the Chinese and Russians want to practice in those waters because, in a conflict, the geography of their Pacific sea lanes of communication will require the ability to break out through the Japanese archipelago,” he added. “Strategically, these activities demonstrate resolve, with the aim of shaking U.S.-Japanese confidence.”

James D.J. Brown, an associate professor of political science at Temple University Japan, is of the view that Russia wants to deter Japan from continuing to join other Group of Seven members in imposing sanctions. China, meanwhile, wants to send the message that Japan will face consequences if its involvement in the political and security situation around Taiwan deepens, he said.

In turn, Japan and the U.S. will respond with intelligence-gathering as well as drills of their own. These, Brown said, have the advantage of going far beyond what Russia and China manage. “Japan and the U.S. truly exercise together, whereas Russia and China still mainly exercise in parallel with each other,” he added.

Little appetite for compromise

As regional tensions escalate, political ties between Japan and Russia will likely continue to deteriorate under Putin. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, Japan and other G7 nations have been enforcing a number of tough sanctions — including an agreement this month to cap Russian oil prices — that have crippled Moscow’s economy and hampered its ability to finance the war.

Russia, which has been deploying more troops and military equipment to the disputed Northern Territories, has scrapped an agreement with Japan to allow former Japanese residents to visit the islands, in what Kaczmarski described as Moscow’s latest indication that Putin is no longer willing to compromise on their status.

Brown said Japan-Russia relations “are in their worst state” in years.

“Moscow has listed Japan as an ‘unfriendly’ country and has called off peace treaty talks. … Things may get even worse as Tokyo, much to the chagrin of Moscow, backs a price cap on Russian oil,” Brown said. “Russia could also use Japan's continued reliance on Russian energy as leverage, as we have seen in Europe.”

Indeed, Tokyo has been unwilling to cut ties with Moscow entirely, as Russia supplies close to 9% of the country’s liquefied natural gas (LNG). Moreover, Japan is also concerned about what would happen if Russia were to abandon all attempts to impose U.N. sanctions on North Korea.

As for ties with China, analysts argue that Tokyo must tread more cautiously with Beijing, as China is Japan's largest trading partner.

“It is a higher priority for Japan to avoid a crisis in its relations with China,” said Brown. “While Russia just has the energy lever, China has many more means of retaliating against Japanese businesses, many of which remain heavily exposed to the Chinese market. Japan is eager for Washington to take a firm line against Beijing but is keen not to be seen to be doing so itself.”